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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Golan v. Holder raises interesting questions about the Progress 
Clause1 and First Amendment limits on copyright laws. The case 
 
 ∗   Assistant Professor, Boston College Law School, and Affiliate Scholar, Stanford Law 
School Center for Internet and Society. I thank Julie Ahrens, Tony Falzone, Sheila Findley, 
Daniel Gervais, H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui, Lawrence Lessig, Joseph Liu, Charles Nesson, Tyler 
Ochoa, Jennifer Urban, Alfred Yen, and the participants at the Friends of the Public Domain 
roundtable at Harvard Law School for valuable comments and critiques. I thank the editors of 
the VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW for excellent editing, and particularly John Charles Williams, 
whose intense focus on clarity and brevity significantly improved the readability of this piece. I 
thank Michael Shinall for his able research assistance. 
 1.  The Supreme Court uses the shorthand term “Copyright Clause” to refer to Article I, 
Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). I join Larry 
Lessig in referring to this Clause as the “Progress Clause.” See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE 
CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND 
CONTROL CREATIVITY 130–31 (2004). I believe that “Progress Clause” is a better description for 
two reasons. First, the Clause is not limited to copyright; it also serves as Congress’s grant of 
power to enact patent laws. Second, the Clause states, at its beginning, that Congress has the 
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stems from section 514 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994 
(“URAA”), which implemented the treaty agreements made at the 
Uruguay Round of negotiations in the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (“GATT”).2 Prior to the United States joining the Berne 
Convention in 1989,3 works from certain countries were ineligible for 
copyright in the United States, and authors were required to comply 
with certain formalities in order for copyright to attach to their 
works.4 Accordingly, a number of foreign works became part of the 
public domain in the United States as soon as they were published, or 
were subject to copyright for a time, but fell into the public domain 
when their authors failed to renew their copyrights. Many of these 
works were then part of the U.S. public domain for decades, until the 
URAA removed them. Under the Uruguay Round of negotiations, U.S. 
trade representatives agreed to “restore” copyright for foreign works 
that were out of copyright in the United States due to a lack of a 
copyright treaty with the foreign authors’ home countries or because 
the foreign authors failed to comply with U.S. copyright formalities or 
renewal requirements.5 This was the first time that Congress passed a 
law removing any significant material from the public domain.6 The 
URAA grants no new rights to U.S. authors.7 
The Supreme Court certified two questions in Golan v. Holder: 
(1) Does the URAA violate the Progress Clause of the Constitution? (2) 
 
power to grant authors and inventors exclusive rights “to promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. As I argue infra Part II, I believe that this language is 
a limitation on Congress’s power to grant exclusive rights. 
 2.  Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 514, 108 Stat. 4809, 4976–81 (1994) (codified as amended at 17 
U.S.C. § 104A (2006)). 
 3.  Berne Convention for the Protection of Artistic and Literary Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as 
revised at Paris on July 24, 1971, and amended in 1979, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27 (1986), 
available at www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/pdf/trtdocs_wo001.pdf. 
 4.  See Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076, 1081 (10th Cir. 2010) (describing the effects of the 
section 514 restoration provision). 
 5.  See 17 U.S.C. § 104A(a)(1)(A) (referring to “restored” works). Some of the works granted 
copyright retroactively by the URAA had been in copyright in the United States, but then lost 
copyright status because the foreign author failed to file for copyright renewal. In many other 
cases, however, the works granted retroactive copyright by the URAA had never been subject to 
copyright in the United States, and thus saying that copyright was “restored” to these works is 
incorrect. In an effort at clarity, I refer to the URAA as providing retroactive grants of copyright 
rather than as “restoring” copyrights. 
 6.  See Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1192 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Based on the foregoing, 
we see no tradition of removing works from the public domain. Indeed . . . removal was the 
exception rather than the rule. Thus, § 514 deviates from the time-honored tradition of allowing 
works in the public domain to stay there.”). 
 7.  See Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 514, 108 Stat. 4809, 4976–81 (1994) (codified as amended at 
17 U.S.C. § 104A (2006)). 
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Does the URAA violate the First Amendment? In this Essay, I will 
consider these two questions in turn.  
The parties’ arguments about the Progress Clause question in 
Golan revolve around whether the URAA meets the “limited Times” 
restriction in the Clause. That issue is thoroughly discussed in the 
briefs and need not be repeated here. Instead, Part II of this Essay 
focuses on another aspect of the Progress Clause. Specifically, I argue 
that section 514 violates the Progress Clause’s requirement that 
copyright laws “promote the Progress of Science.” This is because the 
statute bequeaths copyright status without in return achieving any 
net increase in the creation or dissemination of creative works. Even if 
the Government relies on other constitutional authorities to justify 
section 514—such as the Commerce Clause or the Treaty Power—the 
limitations of the Progress Clause still must apply. I address the First 
Amendment question in Part III. Since First Amendment analysis 
turns, in part, on whether the speech restriction in question violates 
any constitutional limitations on the federal power under which the 
law is passed, I argue that the URAA must fail. Any law that violates 
constitutional restrictions on federal power cannot, by definition, serve 
a legitimate government interest. 
II.   THE PROGRESS CLAUSE REQUIRES COPYRIGHT LAWS TO PROMOTE 
THE CREATION OR DISSEMINATION OF KNOWLEDGE 
A. The Original Meaning of the Progress Clause 
At the time of the constitutional convention, the word “science” 
was understood to have a broad meaning, certainly broader than 
current definitions referring to areas of research that rely on the 
scientific method. “Science” referred more generally to knowledge and 
the liberal arts.8 “Progress,” in addition to meaning forward motion, 
also meant “advance in knowledge.”9 Accordingly, one should interpret 
the phrase “promote the Progress of Science” to mean promote the 
creation and dissemination of knowledge at large. 
In its Golan briefing, the Government argues that the “promote 
the Progress of Science” language of the Progress Clause is a 
 
 8.  See WEBSTER’S AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828), available at 
http://machaut.uchicago.edu/?resource=Webster%27s&word=Science&use1828=on (defining 
“science” as “in a general sense, knowledge” and “any art or species of knowledge”). 
 9. Id., available at http://machaut.uchicago.edu/?action=search&word=progress&resource= 
Webster%27s&quicksearch=on; SAMUEL JOHNSON, DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th 
ed. 1775). 
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meaningless preamble.10 While some analysts support the 
Government’s position,11 most who have analyzed the issue seem to 
think that this introductory language is, in fact, a meaningful 
limitation.12 Likewise, while the D.C. Circuit has held that the 
introductory language of the Progress Clause is nonlimiting,13 it did so 
by relying on dicta from an earlier case rather than by engaging in a 
detailed analysis.14 But neither the Supreme Court nor any circuit 
 
 10.  Brief for the Respondents at 16, Golan v. Holder, No. 10-545, (U.S. Aug. 2011).  
 11.  See, e.g., Scott M. Martin, The Mythology of the Public Domain: Exploring the Myths 
Behind Attacks on the Duration of Copyright Protection, 36 LOY. L. REV. 253, 299 
(2002) (suggesting that the Progress Clause is not a limitation); Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the 
Intellectual Property Clause: Promotion of Progress as a Limitation on Congress’s Intellectual 
Property Power, 94 GEO. L.J. 1771, 1781 (2006) (“ ‘Therefore, the phrase . . . must be read as 
largely in the nature of a preamble, indicating the purpose of the power but not in limitation of 
its exercise.’ ” (quoting 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03[A] (2004))); Ralph Oman, The Copyright 
Clause: “A Charter for a Living People,” 17 U. BALT. L. REV. 99, 104 (1987) (suggesting that the 
Progress Clause “is mainly explanatory of the purpose of copyright”). 
 12.  See, e.g., Thomas B. Nachbar, Intellectual Property and Constitutional Norms, 104 
COLUM. L. REV. 272, 287 (2004) (“Several commentators have attempted to resolve the problems 
posed by the Intellectual Property Clause/Commerce Clause overlap by relying on the ‘structure’ 
of the Constitution. Some have sought to demonstrate that other generally applicable limitations 
on congressional power (and specifically the commerce power) can be implied from the structure 
of the Constitution and consequently that the limits contained in the Intellectual Property 
Clause must also limit Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause.”); Dotan Oliar, The 
(Constitutional) Convention on IP: A New Reading, 57 UCLA L. REV. 421, 423 (2009) (“The 
Framers intended the progress language in the Clause—‘to promote the progress of science and 
useful art’—to limit Congress’s power to grant IP rights.”); Oliar, supra note 11, at 1844 (“The 
Clause empowers Congress to ‘promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts’ rather than 
to ‘regulate’ the arts and sciences, or to ‘make Rules for the Government and Regulation’ of the 
arts and sciences. Whereas the latter language implies a power to pass laws and abolish them as 
Congress sees fit, the ‘progress’ language in the Clause provides a textual basis for the negation 
of the implication that the power to ‘promote’ progress implies the grant of power to ‘retard’ 
progress of arts and sciences.”); cf. Michael D. Birnhack, The Idea of Progress in Copyright Law, 
1 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 3, 34 (2001) (“We do not know what the immediate reasoning for this 
particular formation and wording of the clause was. Its second part, that which elaborates the 
means to achieve the goal (‘by securing . . .’), resembles the Continental Congress’s charge to a 
committee to draft a resolution in 1783. But the final proposal had at least three novel elements 
in comparison to previous copyright law. One is the decision to combine the power to enact 
patent legislation with the power to protect copyrights.”); Malla Pollack, What is Congress 
Supposed to Promote?: Defining “Progress” In Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States 
Constitution, or Introducing the Progress Clause, 80 NEB. L. REV. 754, 758–59 (2001) (“The 
review standard should be higher because (i) Congress has never bothered to take the limits in 
the Clause seriously, (ii) Congress is treading close to textual limits on its power, and (iii) 
copyright statues are limitations on speech.”). 
 13.  Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 378 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“Here the plaintiffs run squarely up 
against our holding in Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102, 112 (1981), in which we rejected the 
argument ‘that the introductory language of the Copyright Clause constitutes a limit on 
congressional power.’ ”). 
 14.  See id. at 381 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (arguing that consideration of the “to promote” 
language in Schnapper v. Foley was dicta, and that “[t]he [Progress] clause is not an open grant 
of power to secure exclusive rights. It is a grant of a power to promote progress. The means by 
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court adheres to this holding.15 Instead, the Supreme Court frequently 
refers to the “promote the Progress of Science” language as limiting 
Congress’s copyright powers.16 Moreover, when analyzing the Sonny 
Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (“CTEA”)17 in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 
the majority opinion expressly noted that the CTEA could promote the 
progress of science,18 yet the Court deferred to Congress on how the 
copyright laws should promote the progress.19  
But deference is not abdication; it is simply another way of 
stating that, when reasonable minds disagree, Congress may decide 
the best way to promote progress. Given the Petitioners’ argument 
that the statute at issue in Golan retards rather than promotes 
progress, the Court cannot avoid addressing how Congress’s power 
arising from the “to promote” language is limited. 
When the Court decides this question, it should hold that the 
“to promote” language both guides and limits Congress’s power to craft 
copyright and patent laws. First, the most natural reading of the 
Progress Clause is that Congress is granted the power to give 
exclusive rights to authors “to promote the Progress of Science.” To 
read the “to promote” language of the Clause as a nonrestrictive 
preamble is, in effect, to read the meaning out of the Constitution.20 
 
which that power is to be exercised is certainly the granting of exclusive rights—not an elastic 
and open-ended use of that means, but only a securing for limited times.”). 
 15.  In Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 211 (2003), the majority, while discussing the 
Petitioners’ argument, cites Eldred v. Reno for the proposition that “the preamble of the 
Copyright Clause is not a substantive limit on Congress’ legislative power.” But this is either an 
acknowledgement that the Petitioners did not raise the issue, or, at most, dicta. 
 16.  See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. at 212 (“As petitioners point out, we have described the 
Copyright Clause as ‘both a grant of power and a limitation,’ and have said that ‘the primary 
objective of copyright’ is ‘to promote the Progress of Science.’ ” (citing Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural 
Tel. Serv. Co. 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) and Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 
5 (1966))); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989) (“The Patent 
Clause itself reflects a balance between the need to encourage innovation and the avoidance of 
monopolies which stifle competition without any concomitant advance in the ‘Progress of Science 
and useful Arts.’ As we have noted in the past, the Clause contains both a grant of power and 
certain limitations upon the exercise of that power.”).  
 17.  Pub. L. No. 105-298, tit. I, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 
101, 108, 203, 301–304 (2006)). 
 18.  Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. at 213 (“The justifications we earlier set out for Congress’ 
enactment of the CTEA . . . provide a rational basis for the conclusion that the CTEA ‘promotes 
the Progress of Science.’ ”). 
 19.  Id. at 204 (“Satisfied that the CTEA complies with the ‘limited Times’ prescription, we 
turn now to whether it is a rational exercise of the legislative authority conferred by the 
Copyright Clause. On that point, we defer substantially to Congress.”). 
 20.  See Edward C. Walterscheid, Musings on the Copyright Power: A Critique of Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, 14 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 309, 355 (2004) (“By accepting the premise that the ‘to 
promote’ language of the Clause is merely a preamble that does not substantively limit the 
legislative power of Congress, and that this language has no relevance in interpreting 
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Such a reading is at odds with the generally accepted interpretive 
approach to the Constitution in which every word serves a purpose.21 
Had the founders wanted to grant Congress a general patent and 
copyright power, they could have done so easily by eliminating the 
Clause’s preamble. All the other clauses in Section 8 of the 
Constitution outline generic grants of power without limitations.22 
Thus, the fact that the Progress Clause contains a limiting preamble 
deserves attention. As a matter of common sense, it should mean 
something. The meaning is obvious: the Progress Clause is both a 
grant of power to Congress and a limitation on its use.23 
It makes sense that the founders would limit the grant of 
copyright and patent powers in the Constitution given England’s 
experience with royal grants of monopolies in copyright and patents to 
friends of the Crown.24 In seventeenth-century England, patents and 
copyrights were dispensed not to inventors and authors, but to favored 
courtiers who profited from monopoly pricing.25 These monopolies did 
 
other language of the Clause, the Eldred Court effectively interpreted the Clause as though it 
reads: ‘Congress shall have Power . . . To secure to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their respective Writings and Discoveries.’ ”). 
 21.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803) (“It cannot be presumed, that 
any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect.”); James Monroe, Views of the 
President of the United States on the Subject of Internal Improvements, May 4, 1822, in II 
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789–1908, at 144, 163 (James D. Richardson ed., 
1909) (“[N]o part of the Constitution can be considered useless; no sentence or clause in it 
without a meaning.”). 
 22.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress power, inter alia, “to lay and collect 
Taxes,” “to borrow money,” “to regulate Commerce,” “to coin Money,” “to declare War,” and “to 
provide and maintain a Navy”). 
 23.  Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973) (stating that the Progress Clause 
“describes both the objective which Congress may seek and the means to achieve it”). Cf. 
Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176–77 (“The powers of the legislature are defined and limited; 
and that those limits may not be mistaken or forgotten, the constitution is written. To what 
purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to writing, if these 
limits may at any time be passed by those intended to be restrained? The distinction between a 
government with limited and unlimited powers is abolished if those limits do not confine the 
persons on whom they are imposed, and if acts prohibited and acts allowed are of equal 
obligation.”); EDWARD WALTERSCHEID, THE NATURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAUSE: A 
STUDY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 157 (2002) (“[P]owers are both granted and limited in the 
Constitution, and . . . limitations may not be ignored.”). 
 24.  See Shubha Ghosh, Deprivatizing Copyright, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 387, 439 (2003) 
(“[T]he framers of the Constitution and drafters of various copyright statutes were cognizant of 
copyright’s roots in licensing and publishing monopolies, and were wary of repeating the 
mistakes of England.”). 
 25.  See William F. Dana, “Monopoly” Under the National Anti-Trust Act, 7 HARV. L. REV. 
338, 340 (1894) (“[Queen Elizabeth] granted her servants and courtiers patents for monopolies; 
and these patents they sold to others, who were thereby enabled to raise commodities to what 
price they pleased, and who put invincible restraints upon all commerce, industry, and 
emulation in the arts.”); Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative 
Power: The Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. 
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nothing to encourage innovation and only resulted in higher prices. 
Due to the unpopularity of this practice, Parliament eventually 
enacted statutes to prohibit such monopoly grants to anyone other 
than inventors and authors.26 These statutes also limited the terms of 
patents and copyrights. In 1623, Parliament passed the Statute of 
Monopolies, which invalidated all exclusive privileges except those 
granted to “true and first Inventor[s].”27 In 1710, Parliament passed 
the Statute of Anne, which vested copyrights only in authors and only 
for a limited term of fourteen years.28 This replaced the royal grant of 
monopoly in book printing that the Stationers’ Company had held for 
over one hundred years.29 Hence, by the eighteenth century, England 
had replaced monopolistic patent and copyright laws with limited-
term grants of exclusive rights to inventors and authors in order to 
encourage innovation and creation.30 The founders of the United 
States were well aware of this English history. Set against this 
historical backdrop, it is hard to view the text of the Progress Clause 
as anything other than delimiting. 
The question of whether the URAA promotes the progress of 
science should be read according to the founders’ understanding of the 
Progress Clause. While the Supreme Court should defer to Congress’s 
determinations of how best to promote the creation and dissemination 
of creative works, the Court cannot abdicate its responsibility to 
 
REV. 1119, 1169 (2000) (“[T]he term extension looks very much like the same sort of abuse 
condemned by Parliament and the English courts in the two centuries before the Constitutional 
Convention. Queen Elizabeth granted a number of monopolies to successful courtiers.”). 
 26.  See Nachbar, supra note 12, at 330 (“In response to what it considered to be abuse 
of monopolies by the crown, Parliament in 1623 passed the Statute of Monopolies, which 
prohibited the granting of royal monopolies.”); E. Thomas Sullivan, The Confluence of Antitrust 
and Intellectual Property at the New Century, 1 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 1, 6 (2000) (“Although 
the Statute of Monopolies abolished the royal power to create monopolies, the Statute 
allowed Parliament to grant patents to inventors for new inventions.”). 
 27.  Statute of Monopolies, 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3, § VI (Eng.) available at http://www. 
legislation.gov.uk/aep/Ja1/21/3. 
 28.  Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.), available at http://www. 
copyrighthistory.com/anne.html. 
 29.  See Nachbar, supra note 12, at 332 (“Some have argued that the Statute of Anne 
represented a fundamental shift in English intellectual property law that was intended to, and 
did, lead to the eventual collapse of a particular monopoly: the publishing monopoly enjoyed by 
the English Stationers’ Company.”). 
 30.  See Ghosh, supra note 24, at 433 (“By securing authors’ rights, the Statute 
of Anne made possible the category of literary property, or rights in books and literary works 
akin to rights in land. The case law . . . represented attempts by the booksellers to regain their 
exclusive rights from authors in order to maintain their market position against publishers in 
Scotland . . . By creating incentives for the introduction of new books, the recognition of copyright 
as a statutory right (and not a perpetual right) reduced the publishers’ monopoly in the 
publication of the old, most profitable works.”). 
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ensure that copyright laws actually promote such creation and 
dissemination. 
B. Section 514 Does Not Promote the Creation or Dissemination of 
Knowledge 
Petitioners argue that the URAA does not “promote the 
Progress of Science” because it fails to provide any additional 
incentive to create new works. Instead, it merely grants economic 
rights—monopoly rights in retroactively copyrighted works—to 
authors and their heirs.31 Petitioners argue that granting such 
economic rights to foreign authors and their estates in the hope that 
foreign countries will grant similar economic rights to American 
authors does nothing to promote the progress of science and useful 
arts.32 The Government does not contest that the URAA provides no 
incentive to create new works. Instead, the Government argues that, 
even if the preamble to the Progress Clause is a limitation, it does not 
restrict Congress to passing only copyright laws that encourage the 
creation of new works.33 The Government points to historical examples 
of Congress granting copyrights for preexisting works34 or extending 
the term of existing works.35 
This argument that Congress may satisfy the “promote the 
Progress of Science” limitation by means other than simply 
encouraging creation of new works seems correct, within certain 
bounds.36 As explained above, at the time the Constitution was 
 
 31.   Brief for the Petitioners at 30, Golan v. Holder, No. 10-545 (U.S. June 14, 2011). 
 32.  Id. at 24. Note that the URAA is different from the CTEA, which was at issue in Eldred 
v. Ashcroft. In Eldred the Supreme Court held that the CTEA, which retroactively increased 
copyright terms for existing works, was constitutional because it may increase incentives to 
create and disseminate works. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 206 (2003). 
 33.  Brief for the Respondents, supra note 10, at 17 (“As this Court recognized, ‘if the only 
way to promote the progress of science were to provide incentives to create new works,’ then ‘the 
United States could not “play a leadership role” in the give-and-take evolution of the 
international copyright system.’ ”). But note that this may be a bit of a straw man, because 
Petitioners never argue that providing incentives to create new works is the only way to promote 
progress. Rather, Petitioners simply argue that the URAA does not promote progress. 
 34.  Id. at 21 (“Against this backdrop, the First Congress conferred federal copyright 
protection upon all ‘books,’ ‘maps,’ and ‘charts’ ‘already printed.’ The effect of that enactment was 
to remove a number of existing works from the public domain.”). 
 35.  Id. at 23 (“The clear practical effect of the 1790 Act was to confer federal copyright 
protection upon many works that were previously subject to unrestricted exploitation by the 
public. Enactment of a law having that effect reflects Congress’s implicit understanding that its 
powers under the Copyright Clause extended to works in the public domain.”). 
 36.  The Government might have argued, however, that the URAA actually does incentivize 
new works. In rare cases, authors of retroactively copyrighted works may be motivated to create 
derivative works if they believe that publication of the new work will drive additional sales of the 
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drafted, “progress” of “science” referred to the creation and 
dissemination of knowledge.37 Accordingly, copyright laws that 
encourage either the creation or dissemination of creative works will 
survive constitutional scrutiny, so long as Congress obeys the 
remainder of the Progress Clause. 
Unfortunately for the Government, the net effect of the URAA 
is to discourage dissemination of existing works to a much greater 
extent than it encourages dissemination. It is true that grants of 
retroactive copyrights to authors or their heirs may encourage those 
authors and heirs to seek greater dissemination of their existing 
works, so that they may benefit from the monopoly pricing that 
copyright allows. If the expected returns are high enough, the authors 
may even be motivated to incur costs to advertise and promote their 
works—and thus will promote the public good by providing more 
information to people who might use their works. But these benefits 
are far outweighed by a general loss of access, because the public is no 
longer allowed to freely reproduce and disseminate the works. The 
above-market pricing that monopoly allows will leave those who are 
unwilling to pay the additional costs without the benefit of owning or 
using the works. And if the works are valuable, a publisher will be 
motivated to print and sell them without any need for exclusive 
rights.38 Because of this net effect, the URAA irretrievably fails to 
comport with the meaning of the Progress Clause discussed in Part 
II.A. 
If the Court holds that the URAA fails under the Progress 
Clause, as I believe it should, may the Court uphold the statue under 
another grant of power in the Constitution? The Government argues 
that the URAA can pass muster as Commerce Clause or Treaty Power 
legislation, and it recommends that the Court remand the case for 
consideration of these issues if it finds the URAA unsupportable under 
the Progress Clause.39 But this argument is wrong for the reasons 
explained convincingly in both the Petitioners’ brief and the amicus 
brief by the Cato Institute.40 Congress cannot purport to rely on a 
 
retroactively copyrighted work. If sales of the new work alone suffice to compensate the author 
for her creation, then the retroactive copyright will not drive new creation. Thus, an additional 
incentive to create will only be present in the very rare case where the creation of the new work 
does not pay for itself. Rather, creation of the new work must drive enough sales of the old work 
so that creation of the new work is profitable when sales are combined.  
 37.  See supra Part II.A. 
 38.  Penguin Classics are examples of public domain works of “classic” literature that sell 
for low prices, yet remain profitable enough for the publisher to meet market demand. 
 39.  Brief for the Respondents, supra note 10, at 33 n.15. 
 40.  Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 31, at 62–65; Brief for the Cato Institute as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 12–14, Golan, No. 10-545 (U.S. June 21, 2011). 
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more general constitutional grant of power to avoid limitations in a 
specific grant of power.41 If the government could do so, it would make 
the specific limitations meaningless.42 
III.  SECTION 514 IS NOT SUPPORTED BY A LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT 
INTEREST 
Another independent limitation on government action is the 
First Amendment. I will not address whether the URAA is sufficiently 
narrowly tailored to the purported government interests, as this issue 
is well briefed by the parties. Instead, I will focus on the first part of 
the First Amendment analysis—whether the Government has offered 
a legitimate interest for passing the URAA. I argue that any 
“legitimate government interest” must comply with relevant 
constitutional limitations on federal power. Because the URAA is a 
copyright law governed by the limitations of the Progress Clause, the 
URAA may not be said to serve a “legitimate government interest” if it 
does not “promote the Progress of Science.” In other words, the 
legitimacy of copyright laws such as the URAA must be measured by 
whether they conform to the limits of the Progress Clause. 
In an earlier appeal in this case, the Tenth Circuit held that 
the URAA is not within the traditional contours of copyright 
legislation; thus, the statute required First Amendment scrutiny.43 On 
remand, the District Court for the District of Colorado held that the 
URAA is content neutral in that it does not discriminate based on the 
substance of a work. As a result, the court applied intermediate 
scrutiny.44 The court ruled that under intermediate scrutiny, the 
URAA violated the First Amendment because the URAA was not 
sufficiently narrowly tailored to the Government’s legitimate 
interest.45 The Tenth Circuit reversed on appeal, holding that the 
statute was tailored narrowly enough to the Government’s interest to 
 
 41.  See Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 469 (1982) (holding that Congress 
could not rely on the Commerce Clause to pass a bankruptcy law that violated the Bankruptcy 
Clause’s requirement that bankruptcy laws be “uniform”). 
 42.  See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957) (“[N]o agreement with a foreign nation can 
confer power on the Congress . . . free from the restraints of the Constitution.”). 
 43.  Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1187–88 (10th Cir. 2007).  
 44.  Golan v. Holder, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1170 (D. Colo. 2009). The intermediate scrutiny 
standard, as applied in First Amendment analysis, requires that a statute “advance[] important 
governmental interests unrelated to the suppression of free speech and does not burden 
substantially more speech than necessary to further those interests.” Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. 
FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189 (1997).  
 45.  Golan v. Holder, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1177. 
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survive scrutiny.46 Yet neither court analyzed whether the asserted 
government interests were “legitimate” under the Progress Clause.47 
The Government put forth three separate interests purportedly 
served by the URAA: (1) an interest in securing reciprocal retroactive 
copyright protection for U.S. authors overseas; (2) an interest in 
attaining “indisputable compliance” with international treaties; and 
(3) an interest in “remedying past inequities of foreign authors 
who . . . never obtained copyrights in the United States.”48 At first 
blush, each of these interests seems to qualify as an important 
government goal. Thus, one might think that Congress could enact the 
URAA without regard to the Progress Clause’s limitations, so long as 
the speech burdened by the law is narrowly tailored to one of these 
interests. As I discuss above, however, copyright laws cannot be 
constitutional unless they conform to the limits of the Progress 
Clause, even if Congress claims to pass the laws under a general grant 
of power. And none of the interests advanced by the Government 
serves the purposes behind the Progress Clause. 
It is notable that the government interests underlying the 
URAA are distinct from the typical government interests subject to 
First Amendment scrutiny. For one thing, most First Amendment 
cases involve evaluating whether laws passed under the state police 
power unduly burden speech. Because the states—unlike the federal 
government—have general police powers, the Court need not evaluate 
whether the law is legitimate vis à vis a particular constitutional 
grant and restriction on power. Instead, the law merely needs to 
comply with proper legislative procedures for ratification into state 
law. If the state law restricts speech in some way, then the restriction 
must be narrowly tailored to the government interest justifying the 
law. In some cases, the Court even refers to the underlying 
government interests as “the evils the [government] seeks to 
eliminate” by enacting the speech-restrictive statute.49 Examples 
include parade and protest permit requirements,50 limitations on 
 
 46.  Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076, 1083 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 47.  The District Court found an important interest in adhering to Berne, Golan v. Holder, 
611 F. Supp. 2d at 1172, and the Tenth Circuit found one in the protection of American interests 
abroad, Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d at 1083. However, neither court addressed the impact of the 
Progress Clause on the First Amendment analysis. 
 48.  Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d at 1083. 
 49.  Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 n.7 (1989) (“[F]ocus[ing] on the source 
of the evils the [government] seeks to eliminate . . . without at the same time banning or 
significantly restricting a substantial quantity of speech that does not create the same evils . . . is 
the essence of narrow tailoring.”). 
 50.  Sullivan v. City of Augusta, 511 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 2007). 
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roadway signage to improve traffic safety,51 and aesthetic zoning laws 
that prevent some forms of signs and advertising,52 to name but a few. 
The URAA is unlike any of these state laws. In the typical 
state-law speech-restriction case, speech is regulated to avoid 
problems caused by the speech, like unsafe driving due to distracting 
roadway signs. In the case of copyright laws, Congress restricts some 
speech so as to encourage even greater speech.53 The particular 
problem that copyright laws are designed to address is the “public 
goods problem” that results in limited innovation if reproducibility of 
creative works is easy.54 Copyright law attempts to solve this problem 
by granting authors exclusive control over their original works for 
limited times. The Progress Clause authorizes Congress to create 
patent and copyright laws subject to several restrictions. “Exclusive 
rights” may be granted only to “authors” of original works55 for 
“limited Times.”56 In addition, as I explain above, the Progress 
Clause’s preamble requires that copyright laws must “promote the 
Progress of Science.”57 The government’s interest must respect these 
restrictions in order to be legitimate for the purposes of the First 
Amendment. 
 
 51.  Prime Media, Inc. v. City of Brentwood, 398 F.3d 814 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 52.  Members of the City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984). 
 53.  See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) 
(describing copyright law as “the engine of free expression” by providing economic incentives to 
create new works of speech); Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment 
Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1192 (1970) (“In some degree 
[copyright] encroaches upon freedom of speech . . . but this is justified by the greater public good 
in the copyright encouragement of creative works.”). 
 54.  See Brian D. Johnston, Rethinking Copyright’s Treatment of New Technology: Strategic 
Obsolescence as a Catalyst for Interest Group Compromise, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 165, 166 
(2008) (“With the invention of the printing press and movable type, the effort required 
to reproduce a literary work became significantly less than the effort required to author the 
work. Copyright law intervenes in the name of the public good to protect the author from the 
inexpensive copying made possible by technology and to preserve 
authors’ incentives to create new works, as well as publishers’ incentives to disseminate those 
works.”); Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Towards an Integrated Theory of Intellectual 
Property, 88 VA. L. REV. 1455, 1466–67 (2002) (“Copyrights and patents are predicated on the 
need to provide an economic incentive for the creation of public goods such as inventions and 
expressive works. Since expressive works and inventions contain information—the 
quintessential public good—absent legal protection, competitors would copy such works without 
incurring the initial costs of producing them. Unauthorized reproduction would drive down the 
market price to the cost of copying, original authors and inventors would not be able to recover 
their expenditures on authorship and R&D, and, as a result, too few inventions and expressive 
works would be created.”). 
 55.  Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (discussing the 
constitutional requirement of originality in copyrightable works, and denying copyright to a set 
of telephone-book white pages due to lack of originality). 
 56.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 57.  Id. 
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A consideration of the Government’s three proposed interests 
suggests that the “evil” being eliminated by the URAA is not the 
problem of insufficient creation and dissemination of copyrightable 
works, which is the problem the Progress Clause sanctions Congress 
to remedy. 
First, as to the Government’s interest in achieving reciprocal 
retroactive copyrights for U.S. authors abroad, the only “evil” is a lack 
of exclusive ownership rights. Under this rationale, the URAA secures 
exclusive rights abroad for previously published works by U.S. authors 
in exchange for providing foreign authors the same rights in the 
United States.58 The Progress Clause does not condone exclusivity as 
an end in itself. 
Correcting the Government’s second claimed “evil”—past 
inequitable treatment of some foreign authors—requires giving 
monopolies to those authors or their estates over works that were once 
in the public domain and free to all. As discussed in Part II.B, 
removing works from the public domain does not comport with the 
proper understanding of promoting progress. 
Similarly, the Government’s need to achieve its third interest—
“indisputable compliance” with the Berne Convention—cannot justify 
action that violates the Progress Clause. While adhering to 
international treaty obligations is a legitimate government interest, 
treaties are inferior to the Constitution. The argument that 
constitutional restrictions should be ignored simply because of the 
government’s international agreements should never be a sufficient 
justification for subverting the Constitution.59 
In short, the Government’s three proposed interests fall short 
of justifying the URAA’s restriction on speech. As I explain above, the 
Progress Clause requires that copyright laws “promote the Progress of 
Science.” Each of the Government’s purported interests in passing the 
 
 58.  The Government may believe that it has a legitimate interest in securing these 
exclusive rights for U.S. authors. After all, the monopoly pricing from such exclusive rights may 
lead to greater profits for U.S. residents, and thus to higher GDP and tax revenue. It is true that 
U.S. residents will also have to pay higher prices for the retroactive copyrights granted in the 
United States, but according to congressional testimony, more retroactive copyrights would be 
granted to U.S. authors abroad under the URAA than would be granted to foreign authors in the 
United States. Thus, Congress may have thought of the retroactive copyrights and limited 
reliance rights as a net plus to the U.S. economy. See Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076, 1089 (10th 
Cir. 2010) (reviewing testimony before Congress about foreign response to the United States’ 
approach to copyright restoration). 
 59.  See Karen B. Brown, Allowing Tax Laws to Cross Borders to Defeat International Tax 
Avoidance: The Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, 15 BROOK. J. 
INT’L L. 59, 96 (1989) (“[T]he federal government may not ignore the strictures of the United 
States Constitution in exercising its treaty power.”). 
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URAA involves creating private benefits for authors. Yet none of the 
Government’s purported interests in passing the URAA promote the 
net spread of knowledge by encouraging the creation or dissemination 
of creative works. This is a fatal problem for the Government’s 
argument, because when it comes to copyright law, the only legitimate 
interest Congress may pursue is encouraging the diffusion of 
knowledge by promoting the creation and dissemination of creative 
works. Accordingly, the Government’s justifications cannot qualify as 
legitimate government interests that surmount the hurdle of the First 
Amendment and justify restricting speech by removing works from the 
public domain. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Even under the most generous arguments for the URAA, the 
statute is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court should hold that the 
URAA violates the “promote the Progress of Science” limitation of the 
Progress Clause. The URAA is also unconstitutional under the First 
Amendment because the only legitimate government interest in 
passing copyright laws is to promote the progress of science. This 
conclusion is bolstered by the fact that each purported government 
interest supporting the URAA serves goals other than promoting the 
progress of science. The separate questions presented in Golan merge 
the Progress Clause and First Amendment issues into one analysis. 
After completing this intertwined analysis, the URAA is invalid under 
both constitutional mandates. 
 
